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PATRICIA HUSTON, Trustee of
Trust A and Trust B under
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATELINE PROPERTIES, INC
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.
Did the lower court err in refusing to extend the
statutory redemption peri orl furt her „, a ft P r qraint i nq an nxtens ion
of five weeks, to a party seeking ;

redeem real property sold at

a foreclosure sale under Rule 69(f

**a: Rules of Civil

Procedure,, whpri ( IIP party seeki

d i d not. t p n d p r t h e

full redemption amount, defined under Rule 69(f)(3), -*- ordered
by the court?

G:\wpl\088\0000083x w5I

II.
Is a party seeking redemption of real property sold at
a foreclosure sale under Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, entitled to set off against the redemption amount any
general damages allegedly caused to the property by the purchaser
at the sale during the redemption period?
STATEMENT QF THg CA$S
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a ruling by the lower court at a

hearing on October 2, 1989, by which the court ordered appellants
Russell R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis (hereinafter the "Lewises") to
pay into court the full amount necessary to redeem the subject
real property by the close of business October 3, 1989, and
ordering further that if the Lewises failed to deposit the money
with the court within that period that their redemption rights
would be deemed to have lapsed.

B.

(R. 649-55. )

Disposition of the Case 9?XQg>
On August 28, 1989, the Lewises obtained an ex parte

order from the trial court extending the redemption period for a
parcel of real property sold at a sheriff7 s sale on February 28,
1989.

(R. 502-05.)

The purchaser of the real property, Appellee

Stateline Property, Inc. (hereinafter "Stateline"), moved to
dissolve the court' s order extending the redemption period.
549-52. )

(R.

On September 8, 1989, the court ordered the Lewises to

-2G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

pay the full redemption amount into an interest bearing account
within five days, and the redemption period would be extended to
the next hearing on the matter.
R. 660, at 3; R. 594. )
amount.

(Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing,

The Lewises did not pay the redemption

A further hearing was held on October 2, 1989, at which

the court ordered the Lewises to pay the full redemption amount
by October 3, 1989, or their redemption right would be deemed
irrevocably lapsed.

(R. 652-54. )

Again, the Lewises failed to

pay the redemption amount into court and their redemption rights
were deemed to have lapsed.

On November 13, 1989, the Lewises

filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 656-57) from the court's ruling at
the hearing of October 2, 1989, which was later memorialized in
the Order of October 13, 1989.

(R. 649-55. )

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about February 28, 1989, Stateline purchased
certain real property (the "property") at a foreclosure sale
conducted by the Tooele County Sheriff.

The property is located

in Tooele County/ State of Utah, and was formerly known as the
"Patio Motel."

Stateline paid the amount of $210,000.00 in cash

to purchase the property.

In compliance with the desires of

Tooele County Health and Human Services and the City of Wendover,
Stateline caused the demolition of two units of the Patio Motel
which had been gutted by fire and commenced work on the other
units to prepare them for eventual demolition.

-3G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

Both the City of

Wendover and Tooele County had previously issued reports and
orders that the units on the property be demolished because it
was unsafe and unfit for habitation.

(R. 553-64. ) l

The Lewises claim to be creditors having a lien on the
subject Property.

(R. 504. ) At the Lewises' request, Stateline

sent a letter to their counsel on August 28, 1989, outlining the
amount due to redeem the Property.
Purchase price
6% redemption fee

The amounts were as follows:
$210,000.00
12, 600. 00

On February 11, 1989, just two weeks prior to the
sheriff s sale, Tooele County Health and Human Services issued an
inspection report which stated in part:
Our inspection found the Patio Motel to be have
[sic] significant health and safety risks to the
public. It is my recommendation that all of the units
be demolished or secured from entry by unauthorized
personnel.
In my opinion, only a very few of the units are
repairable. In my opinion, it would be more cost
effective for the owner to demolish the existing
structures, and build a new motel than to bring the old
motel into compliance. Most of the property within the
buildings have been vandalized and is worth little or
no value.
The furtherest [sic] building north and west needs
to be demolished as soon as possible because of health
and safety problems.
I would encourage you and your attorney to begin
enforcement of the "Dangerous Building Abatement Code"
on the Patio Motel before someone becomes injured in
one of these dangerous structures.
(R. 553. )

-4G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

Insurance
Property taxes
Repairs/maintenance
securing of property
(including materials
and labor)
SUBTOTAL
Less net rents and profits
TOTAL

125. 00
22,618. 53

14. 134. 20
$259, 599. 45
2.878.28
$256, 599. 45

(R. 579. )
On August 28, 1989, (the date on which the six month
redemption period was to run), the Lewises filed a "Motion to
Extend Time for Redemption from sheriff s Sale for Order
Permitting Inspection of Property.M

(R. 502-05. )

On the same

date, the Lewises obtained, ex parte, an order from the trial
court extending the redemption period to October 10, 1989.
504. )

(R.

They also filed a "Petition for Determination of

Reasonableness or Propriety of Redemption Amount," by which the
Lewises alleged that Stateline had committed certain waste on the
Property during the redemption period and seeking an order from
the court entitling the Lewises to set off the damages incurred
as a result of such waste against the amount necessary to redeem
the Property.

(R. 517-24.)

On August 28, 1989, the Lewises also

paid the sum of $50,000.00 into court as a partial tender of the
amount due to redeem the Property.

(R. 530-45.)

After receiving notice of the ex parte order issued by
the court on August 28, 1989, extending the redemption period,
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Stateline filed a motion to dissolve the court' s order, which was
heard on September 8, 1989.

(R. 546-48.)

At that hearing the

court ruled from the bench and ordered the Lewises to pay the
full redemption amount, approximately $256,000.00, into an
interest-bearing account agreeable to both sides within five days
after the hearing.

The court ordered further that, upon payment

of the redemption amount, the redemption deadline would be
extended until a future hearing, which the court tentatively set
for September 27, 1989.

(Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing, R. 660,

at 3; Minute Entry, R. 594. ) 2

The Lewises did not deposit the

money with the court within five days after the hearing, as
ordered by the court.

(R. 631-32. )

Following the September 8, 1989, hearing, counsel for
Stateline prepared a written order to reflect the court' s ruling.
(R. 611-15.)
order.

The Lewises' objected to the form of the proposed

(R. 595-96.)

the proposed order.

Stateline filed a memorandum in support of
(R. 611-24.)

Because the Lewises failed to

deposit the full redemption amount into court, Stateline also
filed a motion to strike the hearing that had been set for
September 27, 1989.

(R. 625-28, 605-10.)

Both of these matters

were heard by the court on October 2, 1989.

1

The hearing set for September 27, 1989, was for the
purpose of introducing evidence on the issue whether Stateline
committed waste on the property during the redemption period.
(Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing, R. 660, at 1-4. )
-6G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

Prior to the hearing on October 2, 1989, the appellant
Russell R. Lewis filed an affidavit in which he attested that he
had obtained the sum of $210,000.00 which, with the $50,000.00
previously deposited in the court, would

"complete the

redemption of the property, no matter what the court determines
the redemption price to be, which amount is now in escrow with
Merrill Title Company . . . . "

(R. 642, H 6. )

The Lewises also

filed the Affidavit of Jeff Merrill, Vice President of Merrill
Title Company, in which he stated that Merrill Title Company was
"holding the sum of $210,000.00 in escrow for Russell R. Lewis
for the purpose of redeeming the property involved in this action
from the Sheriff's Sale to State Line [sic] Properties."
646, H 2. )

(R.

According to Merrill7 s affidavit, the only condition

for release of the funds was Russell Lewis giving a "first lien
position on the property subject to this action in order to
secure repayment of the funds" and delivering certificates of
title to certain vehicles and an airplane to the lender as
additional security.

(R. 645, 11 3. )

At the hearing on October

2, 1989, counsel for the Lewises also represented to the court
that the Lewises had obtained the sum of $210,000.00, to be used
to redeem the property.

(Transcript of Oct. 2 hearing, R. 661,

at 14, 28-29, 32, 35. )
At the hearing, the court ruled from the bench ordering
that, by the close of business on October 3, 1989, the Lewises
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were to deposit in an escrow account the total sum of $256,000,
11

and some odd cents and dollars" by 5:00 p.m. on October 3, 1989,

less the $50,000 which the Lewises had previously paid into
court.

(Oct. 2 Transcript, R. 661, at 38. ) The court further

ordered the Lewises to cause the escrow agent to make and deliver
to Stateline' s counsel a written acknowledgement that such funds
were being held in escrow and a written commitment to pay
promptly the full amount of such sum held in escrow to
Stateline' s order concurrently with the conveyance to the Lewises
of fee title the Property.

(Oct. 2 Transcript, R. 661, at 37-

44. ) The Lewises failed to object to the court's order at the
hearing.

To the contrary, their counsel represented to the court

that they had the money and would be able to perform.

(Oct. 2

Transcript, R. 661, at 14, 28-29, 32, 35-44. ) The court' s ruling
at the hearing was later memorialized in the written order filed
October 13, 1989, from which the Lewises appeal.

(R. 649-55.)

The Lewises failed to cause the written acknowledgement
to be made and delivered to Stateline By October 3, 1989, as
ordered by the court. 3

By operation of the court' s order at the

3

In their brief, the Lewises admit that they failed to
comply with the court's order that the sum of $256,000 by
deposited in escrow. (Lewises' Brief, at 7. ) The Lewises also
attempt to introduce evidence regarding the reasons for their
failure, without any support in the record. I£. Because their
statements in their brief are unsupported by the record, this
Court should disregard such evidence.
-8G:\wpi\088\0000083x.w51

hearing of October 2, (later memorialized in the order filed
October 13, 1989), the Lewises' redemption rights were deemed to
have irrevocably lapsed.

(R. 652. )

The Lewises appealed from the Order of October 13,
1989.

(R. 656-57. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Lewises' redemption rights have lapsed because

of their failure to comply with the court' s orders.

Even after

having a five week extension of the normal redemption period the
Lewises did not tender the redemption amount.

Because an

extension of the redemption period affects Stateline' s
substantive rights, the Lewises' strict compliance with the
provisions of Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
required.

An allegation of waste is not an "appropriate

instance" justifying an extension of the redemption period within
the meaning of Mollerup v. Storage Systems International. 569
P. 2d 1122 (Utah 1977).
2.

The statutory rules governing redemption do not

allow the Lewises to set off or recoup their alleged unliquidated
claim for waste

against

the liquidated redemption amount.

Rule

69(g)(1) specifically provides that a person who purchased
property at a sheriff's sale may sue a tenant who injured the
property during the redemption period after the purchaser' s
estate has been made absolute.

Because the Lewises' did not make

-9G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

their estate absolute by complying with the requirements of Rule
69(f), they have no standing to make a claim against Stateline
for injuries that were allegedly caused to the property during
the redemption period.
3.

Stateline is not a party to this action, never

having been served with process.

Principles of due process

require that Stateline be given full notice of the claim against
it for injury to the property, through service of a summons and
complaint.

Determining whether Stateline is liable to the

Lewises for injury to the property under the two-day hearing
requirement of Rule 69(f)(3) would violate the requirements of
due process.

A claim for waste to property requires full notice

of the allegations and a full opportunity for discovery and
should not be disposed of on an expedited hearing.
4.

The lower court did not err in hearing Stateline7 s

motion to dissolve the court' s ex parte order extending the
redemption period on two days' notice.

In any event, the Lewises

were given additional time to tender the redemption amount into
court and were not prejudiced by the court's order at the hearing
held on September 8, 1989.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT THE LEWISES'
REDEMPTION RIGHTS HAD LAPSED AND EQUITY DOES
NOT REQUIRE AN EXTENSION OF THE REDEMPTION PERIOD.

-10G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

A.

Th3 lOWeff ggurt prppeylyfrelflthat the reflection
period expired on October 3, 1989, for failure of the
Lgwigeg tQ CQPiply With it? prfler that the full
redemption amount be deposited in an escrow account.
Under Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Lewises' redemption right would ordinarily have lapsed on August
28,

1989, which was six months following the Sheriff s sale.

On

August 28, 1989, however, the Lewises obtained an ex parte order
from the court extending the redemption period to October 10,
1989.

(R. 504. )

The Lewises thereafter failed to comply with

the court' s orders at the hearings on September 28, 1989, and
October 2, 1989, that they deposit the full redemption amount
with the court.

Because the extension of the redemption period

affected Stateline' s rights in the property, the Lewises were
required to comply strictly with the provisions of Rule 69(f)(3).
In Mollerup v. Storage Systems International. 569 P. 2d
1122 (Utah 1977), this Court considered whether the lower court
had properly ordered an extension of a redemption period.

The

Court held that a person seeking redemption must be strictly held
to the provisions of the statute:

The right of redemption fras long freen resognigefl »§ a
substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with
statutory terms. It is not an equitable right created
or regulated by principles of equity but, rather, is a
creature of statute and depends entirely upon the
provisions of the statute creating the right.
I£.

at 1124 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added. )

-11G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

The Court further acknowledged that "a court, sitting
in equity, may in appropriate instances extend the [redemption]
period." !&. at 1124 (emphasis added).

Such "appropriate

instances," however, typically involve circumstances which
indicate "fraud, mistake, accident or waiver." !£.

The Court

reversed the lower court' s order extending the redemption period
because such appropriate instances had not been shown.

In

Mollerup. the party obtaining the extension (Green) had not made
a tender of the redemption sum but filed an affidavit alleging
the redemption figures were questionable and not timely
furnished.

Upon review, this Court determined that Green did not

have the financial means to redeem the property but was hopeful
of using the extended redemption period to find a purchaser for
his right of redemption.

l&. at 1124.

The Court held that the

extension as granted was not based upon a showing of adequate
cause as required under Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and amounted to an abuse of discretion under the facts of the
case.

The Court also expressed its concern that permitting an

extension of the period of redemption under the circumstances
presented by Green would treat the purchaser at the sale
inequitably.

The Court stated:

To determine otherwise would allow others
similarly situated to simply appear ex parte,
assert a dispute, a possible sale of the
right to redeem, or some other self-serving

-12G \wpl\088\0000083x w51

matter and the effect would be to abridge the
rights of a purchaser at sale.
ia. at 1125.
The present case presents the same kind of situation.
In order to gain an extension the Lewises appeared ex parte and
asserted a self-serving dispute claiming that Stateline committed
waste on the property.

The Lewises, at the time, did not have

the present financial ability to tender the required redemption
sum and were hoping to buy more time to get their financing in
order.4

At the September 8, 1989, hearing, the court allowed

the Lewises to tender the redemption amount within five days as a
condition of an extension of the redemption period. (Sept. 8
Transcript, R. 660, at 3. )

The Lewises, however, did not tender

the redemption amount.
At the October 2, 1989, hearing, the court overlooked
the Lewises' failure to pay the redemption amount within five
days following the September 8th hearing, and ordered that they
could have until the close of business on October 3 within which
to tender the redemption amount into court.

This order was based

on the representations by counsel for the Lewises that the

On August 25, 1989, an attorney representing the Lewises
informed Stateline' s counsel that the Lewises did not have the
financing available to redeem the property and that there would
be no redemption. (R. 583, U 4. ) The Lewises' present counsel
appeared three days later and filed the ex parte motion for an
extension. (R. 502-05. )
-13G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

Lewises had sufficient funds available in escrow to redeem the
property.

(Oct. 2 Transcript, R. 660, at 14, 28-29, 32, 35, 38;

R. 651-54. ) Again, the Lewises failed to tender the redemption
amount.

Given the plain fact that the Lewises did not have the

money as represented, the lower court did not err in ordering
that their redemption rights lapsed on October 3, 1989.
B.

No "appropriate instances" existed to allow anv further
extensions of the redemption period.
The Lewises argue that equity called for the extension

of the redemption period.

They contend that the concept of

"appropriate instances," described by this Court in Mollerup
should somehow be broadened to include the facts of this case.
Moreover, the Lewises broadly assert, for the first time on
appeal, that Stateline may have engaged in some kind of "wrongful
activity" that would justify an equitable extension.

(Lewises'

Brief, at 16). This kind of broad and unsupported accusation is
precisely what Mollerup warned against. 5
In an attempt to justify their position that they have
established an "appropriate instance" for a further extension of
the redemption period, the Lewises rely upon United States v.

5

There is no evidence in the record that Stateline
"intentionally destroyed the improvements on the property in an
attempt to make it impossible for Lewises to redeem. " (Lewises'
Brief, at 16. ) This Court cannot hold that the lower court
should have granted a further extension of the redemption period
based on speculations and unfounded accusations.
-14G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

Loosley, 551 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1976), in which a redemption was
allowed in spite of a technical failure to comply with the
redemption rule.
redemption period.

Loosley did not involve an extension of the
In Loosley, a purchaser at a sheriff s sale

refused to accept tender of the redemption amount offered within
the original six month redemption period.

The redeeming party

had tendered a good check for the correct amount to the
purchaser' s attorney, but neglected to deliver it with a
certified copy of the docket of judgment or memorandum of
judgment along with an affidavit showing the amount actually due,
all of which were required by law.

The check was also sent to

the wrong person, although the purchaser had actual notice of the
tender.

I&. at 507.

The Court held that the failure to satisfy

these technicalities did not prevent the redemption because the
purchaser waited eight days (allowing the redemption period to
lapse) before objecting to the tender and had therefore waived
any objections.
The Lewises argue that the redemption allowed by the
Court in Loosley "was upheld not because of fraud, mistake,
accident, or waiver," but only because of a failure to comply
with certain "technicalities" required by the law.
Brief, at 15-16.)

The Lewises misread Loosley.

(Lewises'

The "technical"

defects in the redemptioner' s tender in that case are prime
examples of mistake or accident and do not create an "appropriate
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instance" for extending the redemption period beyond the
principles described in Mollerup.

The Court in Mollerup, 569

P. 2d at 1124, specifically cited Loosley as an example of
accident, mistake, or waiver justifying relief from the strict
requirements of the rule.
In the recent case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v.
Gavilan Operating. Inc. . 787 P. 2d 1328 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah
Court of Appeals stated that an extension of a redemption period
is not a "technical" matter within the meaning of Looslev.

The

Court considered whether the holdings of Mollerup and Looslev are
inconsistent:
Mollerup and Looslev, though seemingly inconsistent,
are readily reconciled. Very simply, not all
redemption provisions are alike. Courts, in evaluating
the necessity for strict compliance in these kinds of
cases, focus upon the nature of the statutory
requirements and the likelihood of prejudice. If
failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a
substantive right of one of the parties and possibly
prejudice that party, then courts require strict
compliance. On the other hand, if the requirements are
merely procedural and will not prejudice one of the
parties, substantial compliance is sufficient.
I£. at 1333.
The Court of Appeals considered the factual difference
between Mollerup and Loosley.

The Court concluded that the

extension of the redemption period at issue in Mollerup was a
substantive right requiring strict compliance with the redemption
rule while the technical failures in Loosley did not affect
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substantive rights, thus justifying the lesser standard of
11

substantial compliance."

I&. at 1333-34.

The Court stated

further:
Our Supreme Court in Mollerup was construing Rule
69(f)(3) which sets a time limit of six months in which
redemption must be made. This provision clearly
affects a substantive right of the purchaser. . . . To

allow redemption beyond tfre si*-n\onth period inevitably
compromises and prejudices the purchased s interest.
Consequently, the Court concluded that absent some
significant facts to "move the conscience" of the

Court, it would not extend the redemption periodId. at 1333 (citations omitted; emphasis added. )
Thus, Loosley is clearly distinguishable since it did
not involve the substantive rights of the parties as did
Mollerup.

In Loosley, unlike the Lewises in the present case,

the redeeming party actually tendered the full redemption amount
within the redemption period.

Clearly, Loosley provides no

support for the Lewises.
The Lewises' failure to tender the full amount can in
not be characterized as a "technical" defect like the failure to
deliver a certified copy of the judgment in Loosley.

The tender

of the full redemption amount is the very essence of the
redemption procedure.

Failure to remove preconditions on money

potentially to be tendered is no tender.
Or.

State v. Peterson. 308

632, 784 P.2d 1076, 1078 (1989) (en banc) ("A debtor who

seeks to redeem must follow the statutory terms by ' paying the
amount of purchase money' and must do so unconditionally"). The
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holding in Looslev was consistent with the "appropriate
instances" doctrine of Mollerup because the purchaser had waived
his right to object to the deficiencies of the redemptioner's
tender.

551 P.2d at 508.

The Lewises do not claim that

Stateline waived its rights.

Loosley is a different case than

the present one and provides no support for the Lewises.
C.

There is no evidence in the record to support the
Lewises' statements that thev were hindered from
obtaining the funds necessary to redeem the property.
In their brief, the Lewises allege that they were

"hindered in their efforts to obtain funds to redeem the
property."

(Lewises7 Brief, at 13, 23, 37. )

This factual

allegation, however, has no support whatsoever in the record.
There is no evidence that the Lewises were unable to raise the
money to redeem the property because of any conduct of Stateline.
The Lewises presented no such evidence to the lower court, and
this Court should disregard such unfounded and unsupported
contentions. 6
The Lewises were, in fact, successful in raising the
necessary funds, which they represented to the court by the
affidavits of Russell R. Lewis and Jeff Merrill (R. 642, 646) and

6

As Stateline demonstrated to the court below, its efforts
in demolishing two burned-out units on the property during the
redemption period were justified by the property's unsafe
condition, as noted by governmental inspections that had been
made of the property.
(R. 553-64. )
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by statements made by the Lewises' counsel at the hearing on
October 2, 1989.

(Transcript of October 2 hearing, R. 661, at

14, 28-29, 32, 35. )

There is no evidence in the record that the

Lewises were delayed or hindered at all by any actions of
Stateline in obtaining the $210,000, which they informed the
court were on deposit at Merrill Title Company as of the date of
the October 2, 1989, hearing.

Similarly, there is no evidence in

the record explaining why the money, admittedly on deposit at the
title company, was not paid into court pursuant to the court' s
order at the October 2 hearing.
This Court should hold that the Lewises had ample
opportunity, far beyond the normal six month redemption period,
within which to raise the money to redeem the property and to
tender it into court.

The cumulative effect of the court' s

orders of August 28, 1989, (R. 504), September 8, 1989, (R. 594;
R. 660), and October 2, 1989, (R. 649-55), was to give the
Lewises until October 3, 1989, within which to tender the money,
five weeks after the redemption period should have expired under
Rule 69(f).

Stateline is not responsible for the Lewises'

financial problems nor for their difficulties in raising the
money to redeem the property.
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II.
THE LEWISES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SET OFF
AGAINST THE REDEMPTION AMOUNT ANY DAMAGES
CLAIMED AS A RESULT OF WASTE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED BY STATELINE DURING THE REDEMPTION PERIOD.
A.

The Lewises have no standing to make a claim against
Stateline for iniurv to the property because thev
failed to redeem the property and make their estate
»frgQlyt;9i as reqyirqfl by Ryilq 69(g)(1).
The Lewises' fundamental claim is that they are

entitled to set off or recoup against the liquidated redemption
amount the unliquidated damages that they claim resulted from
alleged waste committed by Stateline to the property during the
redemption period.

The thrust of the Lewises' argument is that

equity allows set off and recoupment, and that such equitable
principles should apply here.

While equity may play a role in

determining whether to extend the statutory period, this Court in
Mollerup clearly stated the rule that:
The right of redemption has long been recognized as a,

substantive right tofreexercised in strict accorfl with
statutory terms. It is not an equitable right created
or regulated by principles of equity but, rather, is a
creature of statute and depends entirely upon the
provisions of the statute creating the right.
569 P. 2d at 1124 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). See Tech-

?luid ServicsBi Inc, v, Cavilan Operating, inc./ 787 p. 2d 1328,
1333 (Utah App. 1990) ("If failure to adhere to the requirements
will affect a substantive right of one of the parties and
possibly prejudice that party, then courts require strict
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compliance"); Johnson v. Smith, 675 P. 2d 307, 310 (Colo. 1984)
(en banc) (court held that statutory redemption "is not a right
derived from equity, but depends entirely upon the provisions of
the statute creating the right.").
Utah law governing the right of redemption does not
provide for an equitable set-off or recoupment for injury caused
to the property during the redemption period.

According to Rule

69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the redemption amount is
the sum of the following:
1.

Amount of the purchase.

2.

Six percent of the amount of purchase.

3.

Assessments or taxes.

4.

Reasonable sums necessary for fire insurance.

5.

Reasonable sums necessary for maintenance, upkeep,
or repair of any improvements on the property paid
by the purchaser after the purchase, with interest
on such amounts.

The rule does not allow a would-be redemptioner to
assert a set-off for waste.

Rule 69(f)(6) expressly allows for

the set-off of the amount of rent or profits from the property,
but again, waste committed on the property during the redemption
period it not mentioned as a factor to be considered in
determining the redemption amount.

Because the right of

redemption is a "creature of statute," Mollerup v. Storage
Systems International. 569 P. 2d at 1124, this Court should not
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imply an equitable right of set-off where none is allowed by Rule
69(f).
Moreover, Rule 69(g)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically provides a remedy to a redemptioner where the
property was injured during the redemption period.

That rule

specifies the procedure by which damages for waste may be
recovered.

Rule 69(g)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states

that after a purchaser' s estate has become absolute, he, or his
successor in interest, may maintain an action to recover damages
for injury to the property by the party in possession during the
redemption period.
(g)

Rule 69(g)(1) states:

Remedies of purchaser.

(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time
allowed for redemption, the court may restrain the
commission of waste on the property, upon motion, with
or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor
in interest. But it is not waste for the person in
possession of the property at the time of the sale, or
entitled to possession afterwards, during the period
allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the
same manner in which it is was previously used, or to
use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to make
the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use
wood or timber on the property therefor, or for the
repair of fences, or for fuel for his family while he

occupies the property.

After his estate has become

absolute, the purchaser or his successor in interest

may maintain an action to recover damages for injury to.
the property by the tenant in possession after sale agfl
before possession is delivered under the conveyance,
(emphasis added.)
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Thus, under Rule 69(g)(1), the Lewises would not be
entitled to make a claim against Stateline for damages for injury
to the property allegedly caused by Stateline until after their
estate in the property had become absolute.

Their estate could

only have been made absolute by their redeeming the property for
the full amount set forth in Rule 69(f)(3) and by waiting until
the six month redemption period had run without further
redemption.

Had the Lewises paid the full redemption amount and

obtained a sheriff s deed to the property, they would have
standing to sue for waste committed during the redemption period.
As it is, they have no standing to make a claim against Stateline
for waste allegedly committed during the redemption period.

Only

after they become the owners of the property do they have the
right to make such claims.
Rule 69(g)(1) specifically provides the remedy
available to the "purchaser or his successor in interest" for
injury to the property during the redemption period.

The Lewises

argue that the language "purchaser or his successor in interest"
would not include a party who had redeemed the property.
(Lewis*^ Brief, at 35. )

The Lewises do not explain, however,

how it is that they would not be "purchasers" of the property if
they paid money to redeem the property.
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A "purchaser" by

definition is one who pays money for property.

Rule 69(g)(1)

plainly contemplates that the "purchaser" is the person who ends
up paying money to buy the property, whether at a sheriff s sale
or through redemption.

Under the Lewises' interpretation of Rule

69(g)(1), only the person who pays money at a sheriffs sale, and
not the party who redeemed the property, has the right to sue the
tenant in possession for injury to the property.

Distinguishing

between a purchaser and a redemptioner based on status of the
person to whom the money was paid makes little sense.

It should

not matter whether the money was paid to the sheriff or to a
purchaser at a sheriffs sale.

If a person who purchased at a

sheriff s sale has a right to sue a tenant in possession for
injury to the property, then so does a person who redeems by
paying the first purchaser.

Any other result would treat the

redemptioner harshly without any justifiable basis.
Thus, for example, if a creditor redeems property
purchased by another at a sale he becomes the "purchaser" under
Rule 69(g)(1) and is entitled to all remedies available to the

Blflgft' 8 Law Dictionary defines the term "purchaser" as
" [o]ne who acquired real property in any other mode than by
descent. One who acquires either real or personal property by
buying it for a price in money; a buyer; vendee. " Black' s Law
Dictionary at 1399 (4th ed. 1968). £££. Wsfrgtsr' g Third Ngy

TAtsTOfltional Dictionary at 1845 (1976); Beavey yt Bgiteg, 109
Ohio App. 164, 164 N. E. 2d 429, 436 (1958) ("the word 'purchaser'
means one who, for valuable present consideration, acquires
property or an interest in property").
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first purchaser.

If another lien creditor with the right of

redemption thereafter redeems the property from the first
creditor, as provided for in Rule 69(f)(4), that second creditor
also has the remedies of a purchaser or his successor in
interest.

The person who ultimately makes his estate in the

property "absolute," in the words of Rule 69(g)(1), is the one
who has standing to sue those who may have injured the property
during the redemption period.

Thus, had the Lewises properly

redeemed the property, they would have become the "purchasers" or
the "successors in interest" to the purchaser and would have all
of the rights that Stateline had when it paid for the property at
the sheriff s sale.
The Lewises' argument that equity should supplement
Rule 69(f)(3), is inconsistent with their unreasonably limited
construction of Rule 69(g)(1).

The two rules should be read and

construed so as to be consistent with each other.

Simply put,

Rule 69(f)(3) describes, as the headings indicate, the "time for
redemption; amount to be paid."

Rule 69(g)(1) sets forth the

"remedies for purchaser" "for waste."

The drafters of Rule 69

clearly provided a means for a purchaser to bring claims for
waste done to the property during the redemption period, but the
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purchaser must first make his estate "absolute."8
Lewises failed to do.

This the

Rule 69(f)(3) simply does not given them

the right to pursue claims against Stateline for injury to the
property.
The Lewises also contend that the term "tenant in
possession," used in Rule 69(g)(1) does not include Stateline.
(Lewises' Brief, at 35. )
unduly narrow.
property.9

Again, their reading of the rule is

A "tenant" is one who has an interest in real

A "tenant in possession" is one who has possession

of property.

During the redemption period, Stateline was a

"tenant in possession."

Thus, under Rule 69(g)(1), if Stateline

injured the property during the redemption period, and had the
Lewises properly redeemed the property, then the Lewises as the
"purchasers" would have the right to sue Stateline, as a "tenant

Rule 69(f)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, describes
how a purchaser makes his estate absolute. Under the rule, if
there has been no redemption, the purchaser "is entitled to a
sheriff7 s deed at the expiration of six months after the sale. "
If there has been a redemption, the redemptioner is entitled to a
sheriff s deed at the end of that period of time. Because the
Lewises did not redeem within the six month period, nor within
the additional time allowed by the couirt, they did not make their
estate "absolute" within the meaning of the rule.
9

Black7 s Law Dictionary defines the term "tenant" as,
" [i]n the broadest sense, one who holds or possesses lands or
tenements by any kind of right or title, whether in fee, for
life, for years, at will, or otherwise." 91acH'S law PAcUonary
at 1635 (4th ed. 1968). £££ Webster7s Third New International
Dictionary at 2355 (1976); Bessinaer v. Grotz, 66 Cal. App. 2d,
153 P. 2d 369, 370 (1944); Caldwell v. Thiessen, 60 Idaho 515, 92
P. 2d 1047, 1048-49 (1939).
-26G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

in possession," for the injury to the property done while
Stateline was the tenant in possession.10
Because the Lewises did not properly redeem the
property, they have no estate in it.

They have no standing to

make a claim for waste against Stateline and are not entitled,
under Rule 69 or otherwise, to set off an unliquidated claim for
damages against the liquidated redemption amount owed under Rule
69(f)(3).

That rule provides very specifically how the

redemption amount is to be calculated and when it is to be paid.
Under the Lewises' reading of Rule 69, a would-be redemptioner
can claim a set-off against the purchaser and refuse to pay the
full redemption amount until after a trial has been held on the
amount of the set-off.

This is a result plainly not contemplated

by the drafters of Rule 69(f).

10

In their brief, the Lewises argue that Rule 69(g)(1):
was obviously not drafted in contemplation of a
destruction of the property by the purchaser in
violation of the rights of redemption. Rather, it was
meant to deal with waste committed by a party already
in possession of the property, who could be the
judgment debtor or his tenant, in violation of the
rights of the purchaser.

(Lewises1 Brief, at 35. ) Thus, the Lewises claim that the term
"tenant in possession" in Rule 69(g)(1) means only a person "who
could be the judgment debtor or his tenant." This argument is
unduly narrow and ignores the fact that, as in the present case,
the purchaser at the sheriff s sale is generally given possession
of the property after buying it at the sale. The sensible
interpretation of the term "tenant in possession" as used in Rule
69(g)(1) includes the purchaser at the sale.
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The case of Goodwin v. Donahue, 299 Ala. 66, 155 So.
587 (1934), involved a similar issue.

There, the Alabama Supreme

Court refused to allow a party attempting to redeem land to set
off against the amount due to redeem the property the amount of
waste or rents.

The court said:

"It is well settled that one in

possession of land, as purchaser at a mortgage sale . . .
chargeable with rent or waste. "
continued:

I£. at 589.

is not

The court

"However, the purchaser, or his vender, may become

liable to account for rents occurring, or for waste committed or
suffered, after an offer to redeem, accompanied by a tender, has
been made. "

XA-

(emphasis added. )

See also Hansen v. Dav, 99

Or. 387, 195 P. 344 (1921) (en banc) (claim for set-off for waste
must come in an action separate from the redemption
proceeding).ll
B.

Rule 69(f)(3) does not entitle the Lewises to a hearing

pn tfre question wfretftey strteiipe committefl injury to
the property during the redemption period.
The Lewises contend that they were entitled to a
hearing under Rule 69(f)(3) on the question whether Stateline
committed waste on the property during the redemption period.
(Lewises' Brief, at 24, 30-32.)

The first paragraph of Rule

69(f)(3) describes in detail the sums to which a purchaser is
11

Utah, by rule, allows rents to be set off against the
redemption amount, Rule 69(f)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
but codified the common law as to waste in Rule 69(g)(1).
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entitled from a redemptioner.

The second paragraph describes the

process for resolving objections to any such sum demanded by the
purchaser, as follows:
In the event there is a disagreement as to
whether anv sum demanded for redemption is
reasonable or proper, the person seeking
redemption may pay the amount necessary for
redemption, less the amount in dispute, to
the court out of which execution or order
authorizing the sale was issue, and at the
same time file with the court a petition
setting forth the item or items demanded to
which he objects, together with his grounds
of objection; and thereupon the court shall
enter an order fixing a time for hearing of
such objections. A copy of the petition and
order fixing time for hearing shall be served
on the purchaser not less than two days
before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing
of the objections the court shall enter an
order determining the amount required for
redemption. In the event an additional
amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk
is required, the person seeking redemption
shall pay to the clerk such additional amount
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith
execute and deliver a proper certificate of
redemption upon being paid the amount
required by the court for redemption.
(Emphasis added. )
This paragraph applies only to disputes over the
amounts demanded by the purchaser, a point plainly acknowledged
by the Lewises.12

The second paragraph of Rule 69(f)(3) does

12

In their brief the Lewises quote the second paragraph of
Rule 69(f)(3). They concede that "[i]t is true that the prior
paragraph of Rule 69(f)(3) lists only items which may be added to
the redemption price and not items to be deducted therefrom. •'
(Lewises' Brief, at 24. )
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not authorize the court to conduct a trial on the issue whether
the purchaser committed waste to the property that should be
deducted from the purchase price.

The hearing provided for in

the rule, which may be held on two days' notice, is solely for
the purpose of determining whether the purchaser is entitled to
all of the amounts demanded.
Thus, in the present case Stateline demanded certain
sums13 in order for the Lewises to redeem the property.

Under

the procedure in Rule 69(f)(3), had the Lewises objected to any
such sums, they would have had to pay the undisputed amount into
court and then would be entitled to a hearing on their
objections.

Thus, for example, had the Lewises questioned

whether Stateline had paid the sum of $22,618.53 for property
taxes, they would be entitled to have a hearing to determine
whether that was a proper amount for Stateline to demand.

They

are not, however, entitled to a hearing on the issue whether
Stateline injured the property during the redemption period.
Rule 69(f)(3) provides that the hearing is to be held on two days
notice.

It is inconceivable that the drafters of Rule 69

envisioned a full trial on an issues of waste on only two days
notice.

Whether property was injured during the redemption

13

In addition to the $210,000 purchase price and the 6
percent fee, Stateline demanded payment of $125.00 for insurance,
$22,618.53 for property taxes, and $14,134.20 for repairs and
maintenance. (R. 579. )
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period must be resolved through the normal litigation process,
specifically provided for by Rule 69(g)(1).
C.

Equity flQ3g notfrllQWfor the ?3t~Qff Qr recoupment; gf
unliquidated claims for waste.
Even if this Court interprets Rule 69(f)(3) according

to equitable principles, the Court should also hold that the
liquidated redemption amount may not be set off by the Lewises'
unliquidated damage claim.

The redemption amount is liquidated

and easily calculable under the formula set forth in Rule
69(f)(3).

The Lewises' claims for damages are unliquidated and

speculative.

The law is clear that the Lewises are not entitled

to set off a liquidated and uncontested obligation with an
unliquidated speculative claim for damages.
In King v. Firm. 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P. 2d 1114 (1955),
the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a tenant to whom a
landlord owed a sum of money was entitled to set off the amount
due to him by the landlord against his rent payments.

The

landlord had terminated the lease and evicted the tenant for
nonpayment of rent.

The Supreme Court, holding for the landlord,

stated that even though the tenant was entitled to a judgment for
the sum owed to him by the landlord, "the debt will not excuse
performance of his contract."

!&. at 1117 (citation omitted).

The rule is equally applicable in the present case.

The Lewises,

who owe a liquidated amount to redeem the property, are not
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entitled to set off that amount against the unliquidated claim
for damages they claim to have suffered as a result of the
injuries allegedly committed by Stateline to the property.
The Lewises argue that King supports their position.
(Lewises' Brief, at 26-27.)

They cite the passage which reads:

Thus under some circumstances a tenant would be
required to pay the rent or lose his rights to the
property under the lease although the landlord owed him
more money than the amount of the rent. This possibly
would not be so if it were undisputed that there was
presently due and owing from the landlord to the tenant
more money than the amount due . . . and the defendant
definitely claimed the right to offset one claim
against the other.
285 P. 2d at 1117 (emphasis added).
The Court in King continues, however, to say that they
do not answer this question because in King, the tenant' s claim
was disputed.

King thus firmly supports Stateline' s position by

holding that a liquidated claim (an undisputed amount due and
owing) may be offset by a defendant against a claim by a suing
plaintiff.

The Lewises' claim, as in King, is disputed and not

an "amount due and owing" from Stateline.

King squarely holds

that liquidated amounts cannot be set off against unliquidated
amounts*

in Mutter Y» Occidental Petroleum fraud » Envelopment,
Corp. , 117 Ariz- 548, 573 P. 2d 532 (1977), the court considered
whether the defendants were entitled to set off general damages
they claimed to have suffered against the liquidated amounts they
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owed under a promissory note.

Affirming the trial court' s grant

of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court relied
on the general rule that "unliquidated damages ordinarily cannot
be set off at law," and that "in matters of setoff equity usually
follows the law. " !£. at 534.

The Court stated further:

The Nutters failed, as they admitted, to make
a timely interest payment. They defended, in
effect, on the grounds that the setoff if
proved and allowed would equal payment in
that the amount of claimed setoff exceeded
the amount due on the note.
Such a defense has been disallowed in
Arizona. A claimed setoff does not
constitute payment of the obligations due and
owing under a note and mortgage. . . . "A set
off for counterclaim does not amount to
payment, since there has been no delivery of
money by the debtor to the creditor. " The
setoff, even if allowed, could not avoid a
judgment of foreclosure.
Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
As the Lewises concede, Nutter indicates that departure
from the rule is allowed only when "some special equity exists."
(Lewises' Brief, at 28. )

The Lewises give examples of the kinds

of equities that would justify the allowance of an unliquidated
claim as including of fraud, insolvency, nonresidence of a party,
insolvency, or "embarrassment in enforcing the demand at law."
(Lewises' Brief, at 29) (quoting Caldwell v. Stevens, 64 Okl.
287,

167 P. 610 (1917)).

These exceptions do not apply in the

present case, but concern parties who are dishonest, judgment
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proof, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court against whom a
rightful judgment in a subsequent proceeding would be impossible
or futile.

The Lewises have not established that they bear this

kind of risk in the present case.
The court in Nutter, rejected claims of insolvency and
inequitable behavior and found no special equity allowing an
unliquidated set-off.

According to the court "[t]he situation

between the parties is not such that justice cannot otherwise be
done."

573 P. 2d at 534.

As in Nutter, the Lewises have a

specific right to sue Stateline for waste, provided they have
first obtained title to the property through redemption.
In Investor Inns Inc. v. Wallace. 408 So. 2d 978 (La.
App.

1981), the plaintiff, as landlord, brought a summary

eviction proceeding against the defendant for nonpayment of rent.
The defendant alleged in response that the eviction proceeding
was improper because at the time of suit the plaintiff was
indebted to him in an amount larger than plaintiff s claim for
rent.

The defendant argued that by operation of law a set-off

occurred/ thereby extinguishing the plaintiff s claim for rent.
Id. at 982.

The court rejected this argument, holding for the

1andlord, s tati ng:
To be applicable, compensation or set off
requires the contemporaneous existence of
distinct, liquidated, and fully demandable
debts.
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A determination of the liquidity of the
debt is an essential prerequisite to deciding
whether the claim is a proper basis for a
plea for compensation. Lack of sufficient
liquidity and demandability will preclude
such a plea.
. . . . Compensation is therefore not
available in these proceedings to offset the
debt owed by defendant for unpaid rent.
Id. at 983 (footnote and citation omitted).

See Skinner v. W.

T. Grant Co. , 642 F. 2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1981) ("a contested
debt may not be used to offset an uncontested debt"); Faber Coe &
Gregg. Inc. v. First National Bank of Chicago. 107 111. App. 2d
204, 246 N. E. 2d 96, 99 (111. 1969) ("A matured indebtedness to
give rise to a right of set off must be certain, already reduced
to precise figures or capable of being liquidated by calculation
without the intervention of a court or jury to estimate them");
Associated Oil Company of Wyoming v. Rector, 50 P. 2d 551, 560
(Colo. 1935) ("A set off or counterclaim does not amount to
payment, since there has been no delivery of money by the debtor
to the creditor. ")

See also

80 C.J.S. Setoff and Counterclaim §

42b.
Thus, the Lewises cannot claim the right to set off any
unliquidated damages to which they might be entitled for the
alleged waste committed by Stateline against the liquidated and
calculable redemption amount that they owe to Stateline under
Rule 69(f)(3).

This principle of law is entirely consistent with
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the scheme set forth in Rule 69, which provides that the
redemption amount must be paid when due (Rule 69(f)(3)) in spite
of claims for waste, which are to be resolved by a separate
action following the redemption (Rule 69(g)(1)).
The Lewises argue that the unliquidated claim for waste
may be set off because it is a recoupment arising from the same
transaction as the cause of action rather than a mere setoff.
(Lewises' Brief, at 28. )

They cite Rogue River Management Co. v.

Shaw, 243 Ore. 54, 411 P. 2d 440 (1966).

Rogue, however, involved

a specific, overpayment of an undisputed amount, which is a far
cry from the speculative, unliquidated damages asserted by the
Lewises.

Moreover, as the Rogue court points out, recoupment may

be used only defensively by a defendant against a plaintiff s

claim.

14. at 443. £s& Marft vil Financial Consultants

Corporation v. Smedley. 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah App.
1990) (a "recoupment" is available where "a defendant receives a
rebate on plaintiff's claim arising from the same transaction").
Stateline has not made any claims against the Lewises in this or
any other case and is only a party because it purchased the
property at a sheriff s sale.

The Lewises are attempting to

use

the doctrine of recoupment affirmatively, which they cannot do.
In addition, the Lewises' claim for waste is more
accurately termed a set-off than a recoupment since the Lewises'
claim for damages, if they had one, does not arise from the same
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transaction as does Stateline' s right to be paid by a
redemptioner.

The Rogue court defined recoupment as follows:

"Recoupment," "set-off" and "counterclaim" are not
synonymous terms. "'Recoupment' [which was a defense
at common law] is defined to be ' the keeping back and
stopping something which is due. ' " . . . The term is of
French origin and means the "cutting back" of the
plaintiff s claim by the defendant. Recoupment is
confined to matters arising out of and connected with
the transaction upon which the action is brought.
Id. at 442 (citations omitted.)14
The Lewises also relied on Freston v. Gulf Oil Co. , 565
P. 2d 787 (Utah 1977).

As with Rogue, that case involved a

specific, undisputed overpayment, not unliquidated, speculative
damages.

Moreover, Freston states that recoupment is inherent in

contractual matters, !&. at 789, while the present case is not a
contractual matter, but a strictly construed statutory right of

redemption. £££ MoUerttp v, Storage Systems Tflterhatiphsq, 569
P. 2d at 1124.
This Court should hold that the Lewises' had no right
to assert a setoff of their unliquidated damages (suffered on

14

The Utah Court of Appeals stated in dicta in Mark VII

Financial Consultants Corporation v, Smsfllev, 133 Utah Adv. Rep.
22 (Utah App. 1990), that the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure essentially dissolve any distinctions between
recoupment, setoff, and counterclaim. I£. at 23. The
distinction may have application, however, in the present case
where Stateline is not a party to the action, having never been
served with process, and is not suing the Lewises.
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property they do not own) against the liquidated redemption
amount.
III.
REQUIRING STATELINE TO DEFEND AN ACTION FOR
WASTE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 69(f)(3)
WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
Stateline is not a party to this action and has never
been served with process or with a complaint.

Forcing Stateline,

as the purchaser in this case, to defend the Lewises' claims for
damages without ever having been served with process, as required
by Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is inconsistent with
the requirements of due process.
Rule 69 very clearly sets forth the proper method for
addressing issues of waste:

a redemptioner must first make his

estate absolute by paying the full redemption amount required by
Rule 69(f)(3) and obtaining title to the property.

If he

believes he has a claim for damages based on waste that occurred
during the redemption period, he is then entitled to file a
separate action against the tenant in possession who allegedly
caused the waste.

Such an action would proceed through the

normal course of litigation, including discovery and the usual
trial preparation.
The interpretation of the rule argued by the Lewises
would place Stateline in an untenable position:

Stateline would

either be required to prepare for and attend a hearing on the
-38G:\wpl\088\0000083x.w51

waste issue without adequate time for discovery and
preparation15 or, if the matter were placed on a normal trial
calendar, Stateline would be required to wait an inordinate
amount of time before the issue could be resolved so that it
could obtain clear title to the property or a repayment of* its
purchase price.
The Lewises rely upon three very dated cases to support
their conclusion that a purchaser becomes a party to an action in
which a foreclosure has been decreed.

(Lewises' Brief, at 33. )

All three cases, however, simply state that purchasers who bid
upon property at a sheriff's sale subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, which has the duty to confirm the sale
and are liable to pay the amount of their bid.

These cases do

not support the contention that a purchaser is subject to a suit
assessing damages for waste which is unconnected with the
sheriff s sale without having been named as a defendant or served
with process.
In Hansen v. Day. 99 Or. 387, 195 P. 344 (1921) (en
banc), the Oregon Supreme Court faced facts almost identical to
this case.

In Hansen, the redeeming party served notice upon the

purchaser within the statutory period of intent to redeem the

13

Rule 69(f)(3) provides that the hearing may be held on
two days' notice which, if the Lewises' interpretation of the
Rule were correct, would be an entirely inadequate amount of time
within which to prepare to defend claims for damages for waste.
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property sold in a foreclosure sale.

The amount of purchase,

interest and taxes was undisputed, but the redeeming party
claimed the right to set off against the redemption amount the
amount of alleged waste committed by the purchasers.

The parties

could not agree on the amount of any reduction and the redemption
period expired.

The redeeming party claimed that the purchaser

was insolvent, and therefore that equity should allow the amount
of damages as an offset against the redemption amount since any
redemption money paid would go to the purchaser' s creditors,
leaving no remedy for the redeeming party upon liquidation of her
claim for waste.

!£. at 345.

The court held that the redeeming

party was not engaged in litigation with the purchaser and the
sheriff could not set off the amount of redemption. !£,.
Furthermore, the allegation of insolvency was not substantiated
so equity could not compel a set off.

Id.

The Lewises rely upon Cogswell v. Brown, 102 Wash. 625,
173 P. 623 (1918), to support the argument that a separate action
to determine waste is not essential.

Yet Cogswell involved "the

suit of the owner for an accounting" which was brought "within
the timm for redemption. "

£&. at 624.

In Cogswell' s suit for an

accounting the defendant was presumably named and served with a
complaint, and the trial allowed for adequate discovery and
inquiry into the allegations against the defendant.

In the

present case, however, the Lewises seek to have the question of
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waste determined in a hearing provided for by Rule 69(f)(3),
within the framework of statutory redemption.
at 38. )

(Lewises' Brief,

In Cogswell, however, the court noted that the statutory

right to redeem was not relevant, having expired, and the suit
was in equity for an accounting.

173 P. at 623-24.

The Lewises

take inconsistent positions by appealing for equitable relief,
while urging the Court to adopt mechanisms intended for legal
relief under the statute.
The cases the Lewises cited in support of allowing a
set-off and recoupment similarly involved parties who were named
in the particular court proceeding, whose rights were determined
at trial and not under a limited expedited hearing process such
as that provided under Rule 69(f)(3).

See Rogue River Management

CQt Yr ShfrW, 243 Or. 54, 411 P. 2d 440 (1966); FrestQn yT Qylf

Qil

Co. , 565 P. 2d 787 (Utah 1977).
IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HEARING
STATELINE' S MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE
COURT' S EX PARTE ORDER EXTENDING
THE REDEMPTION PERIOD ON TWO DAYS' NOTICE
AND IN ORDERING THE LEWISES TO PAY
THE FULL REDEMPTION AMOUNT INTO COURT
BY THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON OCTOBER 3.

A.

The lewises were not prejudiced by haying only two flay?
notice of the hearing on September 9, 1999*
The Lewises also argue that they had insufficient time

to prepare for the September 8, 1989, hearing regarding the
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appropriateness of the extension of the redemption period, having
received only two days' notice.

(Lewises' Brief, at 16-17. )

That hearing was in direct response to the ex parte order
obtained by the Lewises' on August 28, 1989, of which Stateline
received no notice16 and at which Stateline' s property rights
were at issue.

As a result of that ex parte hearing, Stateline

was prevented from receiving clear title to the property that it
had purchased six months earlier. It should not have come as a
surprise to the Lewises' counsel that Stateline would demand a
prompt hearing in response to the ex parte hearing.
At the hearing on September 8, 1989, the court
overruled the Lewises' objection that they had received
inadequate notice of the hearing.

Judge Wilkinson stated:

I don' t think it' s unreasonable--I don' t care what type
of motion it is or whether it' s under an injunction or
not—for them to request a hearing immediately on an ex
parte matter of that sort. And for you to come here
now and object to a hearing at this time, vou don' t

impress me as coming with glean hands(Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing, at 13; emphasis added.)
This Court has recognized that the five-day notice
requirement of Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "is not

16

The record demonstrates that on the day of the ex parte
hearing before Judge Wilkinson, counsel for the Lewises spoke
with Stateline' s counsel on the phone, but did not disclose the
fact that the Lewises intended to seek an extension of the
redemption period from the court. (Affidavit of Ervin R. Holmes,
MI 4-5, R. 583. )
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a hard fast rule, and the trial court may dispense with the
technical compliance thereof if there be satisfactory proof that
a party had actual notice and time to prepare."
30 Utah 2d. 423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974).

Jensen v. Eames,

The Lewises had

actual notice two days in advance and the hearing was in direct
response to the ex parte order previously obtained by the
Lewises.
Furthermore, the August 28th order extending the
redemption period was, in effect, a temporary restraining order
that prevented Stateline from perfecting its title to the
property through receipt of a Sheriff s deed.

Without clear

title, Stateline was restrained from treating the property as its
own.

Under Rule 65A(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Stateline

was entitled to an expedited hearing on its motion to dissolve
the court' s order with two days notice to the opposing party.
satisfied this requirement.

It

(R. 586-88. )

Whether the Lewises had adequate notice for the
September 8th hearing is also moot because the Lewises did not
suffer prejudice from the hearing.

Notwithstanding its bench

ruling on September 8, 1989, the court extended the redemption
period through October 3, 1989, (R. 652-54), only seven days
short of the original extension to October 10, 1989.

The Lewises

can hardly complain that they were prejudiced by only receiving
two days' notice of the hearing on September 8.
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B.

The lewises hfrfl ?fl<?qv9te timg to tender the r^^mptiQa
amount into courtThe Lewises also complain that the court did not allow

them enough time to pay the full redemption amount into court.
They claim that allowing one day after the October 2 hearing to
make the tender was unfair and an "impossible requirement."
(Lewises' Brief, at 19. )

If being able to tender the money

pursuant to the court's order was "impossible" it does not appear
from the record.

The Lewises failed to object to the order at

the October 2 hearing but, rather, assured the court that "[t]he
money is there.

They [Stateline] can have it."

Transcript, R. 661, at 15. )

(Oct. 2

The Lewises' counsel assured the

court that the money was available, and the conditions on the
money could be easily satisfied.

!£. at 28-30.

The Lewises'

complain that the court' s order of October 2 was unreasonable,
yet they were given ample opportunity following the hearing of
September 8 within which to raise and tender the redemption
amount.

On that date, the court informed the Lewises that they

would need to tender the full redemption amount in order to
preserve their redemption rights.

Thus the Lewises, in fact,

were given twenty-five days (from September 8 to October 3, 1989)
to raise the funds and to clear any preconditions to tender.
This is not even considering the full six months which had
already expired following the sheriff" s sale on February 28,
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1989.

This Court should hold that the lower court did not abuse

its discretion in ordering the Lewises to pay the full amount
into court by the close of business on October 3, 1989.
CONCLUSION
The rules governing the right of redemption are clear
and should be strictly adhered to by the Lewises, as would-be
redemptioners.

The Lewises failed to comply with Rule 69(f)(3)

by tendering the full redemption amount within the six month
period following the sheriff s sale.

Moreover, the Lewises

failed to tender the full amount, even after the court gave them
extensions until October 3, 1989, within which to do so.

The

Lewises have had ample opportunity to redeem the property and
this Court should affirm the order of the lower court that the
Lewises' redemption rights lapsed for failure to make a proper
tender of the full amount due.

This Court should hold that any

claims for alleged waste are to be made in accordance with Rule
69(g)(1), only after the a redemptioner has made his estate in
the property absolute.

As a purchaser at the sheriff s sale held

on February 28, 1989, Stateline' s right to receive the full use
and title to the property that it purchased has been compromised
and clouded by the Lewises' failure to follow the specific
procedures described in Rule 69.

This Court should affirm the

lower court's Order of October 13, 1989.
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ADDENDUM
Stateline appends to this Brief a copy of the lower
court' s Order dated October 13, 1989, from which the Lewises have
taken their appeal.
DATED this

*J

day of June, 1990.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By

^ — /•

'U^H/W^^

R. Stephen Marshall
Attorneys for Appellee Stateline
Properties, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Stateline Properties,
Inc. ,

to be hand-delivered this

{/

^

<r

day of June, 1990, to the

following:
Ralph J. Marsh
Backman, Clark & Marsh
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main St. ,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

{U{\\^JA^IS*J^
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I: VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
jl R. Stephen Marshall, #2097
Marilyn M. Henriksen, #4336
Attorneys for Stateline Properties, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA HUSTON, TRUSTEE OF
TRUST A AND TRUST B UNDER
JOHN HUSTON, DECEASED,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
A.R. SPAULDING and JOYCE
SPAULDING, et al.,

Civil No. 83-116

Defendants and CrossClaim Plaintiffs and
Defendants.

The above-captioned action came on for hearing before
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, of the above-entitled Court,
on October 2, 1989.

Defendants Russell and Mitzi Lewis were

represented by Ralph J. Marsh of the law firm of Backman, Clark
& Marsh.

Stateline Properties, Inc., was represented by R.

Stephen Marshall of the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy.

The Court heard argument on the Lewises'

objections to the proposed order on the Court's ruling of

000 coo

September 8, 1989, and on Stateline Properties, Inc.'s motion
to strike hearing.

Having heard the arguments of counsel and

having considered the respective memoranda filed by the
parties, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendants Russell R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis

(collectively, the "Lewises") shall deposit in an escrow
account the total sum of $256,599.45, less any amounts that the
Lewises have previously paid into Court in this matter, and
shall further cause the title company, or other escrow agent,
to make and deliver to counsel for Stateline Properties, Inc.,
by October 3, 1989, at 5:00 p.m., a written acknowledgement
that such funds (in collected funds) are being held in escrow
and a written commitment to promptly pay the full amount of
such sum held in escrow to the order of Stateline Properties,
Inc., concurrently with conveyance to Russell R. Lewis and
Mitzi Lewis of fee title to, and the granting of a first lien
on, the real property located in Tooele County, State of Utah,
that is the subject of the above-captioned action, more
particularly described below:
Beginning on the Westerly side of D Street at a
point North 25°45t West 210.00 feet from the
Southeast corner of Block 13, Wendover Plat "A",
a subdivision of parts of Sections 17, 18 and 19,
Township A South, Range 19 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, and running thence Sout 64°15f West
520.00 feet; thence North 25°45f West 90.00 feet;
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thence South 64°15' West 175.00 feet; thence
North 25°45' West 151.63 feet; thence North
64°15' East 188.10 feet; thence North 25°45' West
108.89 feet to the Southerly right of way line of
Highway 40-50; thence along said right of way
line North 73°36' East 513.73 feet to the
Westerly line of D Street; thence South 25°45?
East 267.06 feet to the point of beginning.
Reserving unto the Sellers, their successors or
assigns, a right of way over a 20 foot wide
roadway, the center line of which is described as
follows:
Beginning on the Westerly side of D. Street at a
point North 25°45t West 290.00 feet from the
Southeast corner of Block 13 aforesaid, and
running thence South 64°15' West 530.00 feet,
more or less; thence North 25°45' West 161.63
feet, more or less; thence North 115.00 feet more
or less, to the Westerly right of way of U.S.
40-50.
It is understood and agreed that said right of
way as above described may cross over a part of a
certain Lot 2, not conveyed but adjoining
thereto, and in the event that said right of way
crossing over said Lot 2 is at any time
discontinued, for any reason whatsoever, said
reserved right of way shall be re-routed to the
East of said Lot 2 over property described above
so as to insure continuous accessibility to U.S.
Highway 40-50.
Subject to all easements and rights of way of
record and all utility lines presently existing
on the said property and all easements and rights
of way, not of record, but which may be
established by prescriptive use, if any.
Subject to the first right of Federal Government
employees and to the second right of employees of
the Western Pacific Railroad to the first
vacancies available at the prevailing rates.
Excepting all oil and mineral rights.
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That no part of said property shall be used as a
service station for the sale of petroleum
products.
The written promise and commitment of the title company, or
other escrow agent, to pay the full amount held in escrow to
Stateline Properties, Inc., shall be absolute and subject to no
conditions other than the conveyance of fee title to the
Lewises and the granting of a first lien on the subject
property, as provided above.
2.

If defendants Russell R. and Mitzi Lewis fail to

comply fully with the requirements of paragraph 1 of this Order
by October 3, 1989, at 5:00 p.m.; or if, at any time, the money
deposited by defendants, as provided in paragraph 1 of this
Order, becomes unavailable, or is withdrawn, or the payment of
such sum becomes subject to any conditions other than those
described in paragraph 1; or if the full amount due is not
immediately paid to Stateline Properties, Inc., on order of the
Court, then the Lewises' redemption rights shall be deemed to
have irrevocably lapsed and shall be of no further force or
effect under Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or
otherwise.
3.

In the event, and only in the event, that the

Lewises comply fully with paragraph 1 of this Order by October
3, 1989, at 5:00 p.m., the Lewises shall then file a petition
with the Court and shall cause such petition to be served on
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Stateline Properties, Inc., in accordance with Rule 4, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, containing any claims for waste or
injury to the property that the Lewises believe that they have
against Stateline Properties, Inc.

On receipt of service of

such petition, Stateline Properties, Inc., shall file an answer
I1 with the Court.

The parties shall thereafter be entitled to

||

! pursue discovery on the issues raised by the pleadings and
shall be entitled to a trial of all such issues.

The

litigation of such claims shall be governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

If the Lewises' fail to prove that they

have been damaged by Stateline Properties, Inc., then Stateline
shall immediately be entitled to receive the sums deposited
into Court and the escrow, together with interest thereon at
the legal rate in an amount to be determined by the Court.
DATED this / 3

day of October, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

^ — Y''7*^zx*£>~
Homer F. Wilkinson
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
By
Ralph J. Marsh
Attorneys for defendants
Russell R. and Mitzi lewis
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Order to be hand delivered this ;
day of October, 1989, to the following:
Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Attorneys for R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
and mailed, postage prepaid, the %T

day of October, 1989 to

the following:
Ben E. Rawlings and
R. Scott Rawlings
Armstrong, Rawlings & West
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Clark W. Sessions
Sessions & Moore
Attorneys for Surety Life
Insurance Company
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
W. Kevin Jackson
Jensen, Duffin, Dibb & Jackson
Attorneys for A. R. Spaulding
and Joyce Spaulding
311 South State, #380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Vincent C. Rampton
Watkiss & Campbell
Attorneys for Marcia Merrill
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Rowland H. Merrill, Jr.
c/o Dean's Great Little Lodge
1821 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Stephen P. Bruno
8261 Maio Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
Bruce M. Hale
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
George A. Pappas
3475 South 700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84119

Dino S. Pappas
3007 South 2515 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84119

James R. Williams
1329 West 7125 South
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Debbie J. Williams
1329 West 7125 South
West Jordan, Utah 84084
James E. Hogle, Jr.
1018 Oak Hills Way
Salt Lake City, Utah

84108
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